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The Throne of Mnemosyne




1 This paper will argue that Peirce was a strong emergentist and that his pragmaticism
was a corollary of this underlying cosmological commitment. Before proceeding with
this argument,  however,  it  is  necessary to explain the methodology used.  First,  the
methodology itself seeks to illustrate the close relationship between emergence and
pragmatism by recognizing that the significance of inquiry lies not in “results,” which
are always provisional,  but rather in the vitality of the semiotic processes of which
these results are emergent properties.  Second, any claims that this paper makes to
originality do not depend on its observation that Peirce’s pragmaticism results from his
strong emergentist cosmology, a conclusion which is arguably self-evident, but on its
analysis of this cosmology in terms of the historical context. It is well-known that past
imaginations of the distant future usually and often even comically reveal themselves,
with the advantage of hindsight, to have been only expressions of their own time, but it
is less well-known that present accounts of “history” are just as often constrained by
what  Peirce,  referring  to  this  very  phenomenon,  called  Ichheit,  or  the  tendency  to
project  contemporary  concerns  and  fashions  onto  the  past  (1903:  MS  475-6).  This
introductory section will then first explain how the pragmatist methodology employed
by  this  paper,  based  on  an  emergentist  cosmology,  seeks  to  avoid  this  peril  while
interpreting Peirce and the long-ago scientific milieu in which he worked.
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Peirce’s system was not an individual achievement (Peirce 1893b: 200; CP 6.317;
W 8.205), but rather emerged from a late 19th century episode in science which has
become so obscure in our own time that “excavations of a scientific Atlantis” (Schacter
2001: 106) are now required to fathom it. This obscurity may be explained by the causal
efficacy of generalizations, a crucial element of Peirce’s system known in the
emergence literature of our own time as “downward causation.” Peirce draws a
distinction between science in general, which is a “living thing,” and the specific
“thoroughly established truths” it produces (1902: CP 1.234). “Mere knowledge, though
it be systematized, may be a dead memory; while by science we all habitually mean a
living and growing body of truth. We might even say that knowledge is not necessary to
science” (Peirce 1893a: 3559; CP 6.428). The “mere knowledge” established in Peirce’s
day is still with us – evolution, genetics, relativity, quantum theory – but only as “dead
memory,” because we have forgotten the long-departed “greater persons” (Peirce
1892c: 21; CP 6.271; W 8.183) who produced them.
3 
Peirce’s version of “downward causation” may explain the current obscurity of past
mentalities in still another way. If “systematized knowledge” ever again “becomes the
object of science, it is because in the advance of science, the moment has come when it
must undergo a process of purification or transformation” (1902: CP 1.234). It is
inevitable, however, that such moments will be resisted. A generalization, like any real
entity, is subject to the law of inertia (Kammerer 1919: 107-21) and will therefore resist
its absorption into a higher generalization. As Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947)
writes: “The obscurantists of any generation are in the main constituted by the greater
part of the practitioners of the dominant methodology. Today scientific methods are
dominant, and scientists are the obscurantists.” (Whitehead 1929: 35).
4 
The main premise of the present paper is that the moment for “purification or
transformation” has come again (Gare 2013) and that Peirce may help to show the way.
A full understanding of his work, however, requires that we must turn away from the
“thoroughly established truths” of his time and toward its actual science: i.e., the now-
forgotten “conjectures, which are either getting framed or getting tested” (1902:
CP 1.234) of his contemporaries, especially those with whom he shared the pages of 
The Open CourtandThe Monist
, the house organs of the American branch of the organized Monist movement (Weikart
2002) founded by the German morphologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919). The stated
purpose of these journals, published in Chicago and environs by an immigrant from
Germany, the zinc tycoon Edward C. Hegeler (1835-1910), and edited by another, the
philosopher and theologian Paul Carus (1852-1919), was, in the former’s words, “to
establish religion on the basis of science” (Guardiano 2017). It is not a coincidence that
Peirce’s final formulation of his system was published as part of such an agenda, as a
comparison with the work of the previously cited Viennese biologist Paul Kammerer
(1880-1926), a vigorous and public activist on behalf of the Monist “religion of science”
and the “social Lamarckism” it espoused (Hofer 2002: 177-83), will show.
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5 
The following argument is divided into six sections, each employing Kammerer as a
guide throughout. The first section, “Emergence,” demonstrates that Peirce was, in
today’s terms, a strong emergentist who argued for mental causation and
antireductionism. The second section, “Habit,” describes the crucial role of habit in
Peirce’s justification for his strong emergentist position. The third section, “Memory,”
points out the striking resemblance between Peirce’s conception of habit and the
Lamarckian “organic memory” theories promoted by organized Monism. The fourth
section, “Mind,” begins with Peirce’s identification of “habit-taking” with the “law of
mind,” a psycho-physical stance closely related to that of Gustav Theodor Fechner
(1801-1887), and proceeds to discuss various proposed physical interpretations of
“organic memory” in terms of physical chemistry, psychophysics, inertia, probability
theory, and what is now called non-ergodicity. The fifth section, “Form,” draws a
connection between “organic memory” and several developments during the same
period: Haeckel’s “general morphology,” the 
Formenlehre
of the mathematician Hermann Graßmann (1809-1877) and his brother Robert
(1815-1901), and Peirce’s concept of “sign,” defined as “any medium for the
communication or extension of a Form” (1906: EP 2.477). The sixth section, “Generals,”
demonstrates how Peirce’s argument for strong emergence is a necessary consequence
of his anti-nominalism. The seventh section, “Religion,” discusses the theological
conclusions Peirce drew from his anti-nominalist stance and compares them to the
“religion of science” promoted by organized Monism. The eighth section,
“Pragmatism,” discusses the consequences of Peirce’s theological views for the three
“normative sciences” (1902: CP 1.281), namely logic, ethics, and aesthetics, thus
bringing the argument linking emergence and pragmatism to a close. The paper
concludes with a brief discussion of the continuing relevance of “organic memory”




Only the current obscurity of the historical milieu in which Peirce worked and
published can account for the recent literature which asserts that “no pragmatist,
perhaps excluding [Joseph] Margolis, has presented any careful conceptual treatment
of emergence” (El-Hani & Pihlström 2002), or for the authoritative recent histories of
emergence in which Peirce’s name is either completely absent or mentioned only in
passing (Blitz 1992; Clayton & Davies 2006; Corning 2012). Peirce, the acknowledged
founder of pragmatism, was in fact “among the first of the early emergentist
philosophers to develop what amounts to a general 
theory of emergence
, an attempt to explain or provide a reasonable account of emergence in general as an
explicable fact of Nature” (Rose 2016: 124). Peirce’s writings indeed abound with
passages which are clearly descriptions of what is today called emergence,
irreducibility, downward causation, and antireductionism.
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The contemporary literature of emergence offers many definitions of these terms, and
the present discussion will begin with those provided by Queiroz and El-Hani, 2006.
Emergentism is “a naturalistic and physicalist position, according to which the
evolution of physically constituted systems show [
sic
], from time to time, critical turning points, in which new organizational patterns arise,
and, thus, new classes of systems exhibiting novel properties and processes” (81).
Moreover, emergentists “treat these 
properties
as irreducible, basically in two different senses: (i) emergent properties can be
irreducible because they cannot be analyzed in terms of the behavior of a system’s
parts (unanalyzability), or (ii) because they depend on the parts’ behavior within a
system of a given kind, and this behavior, in turn, does not follow from the parts’
behavior in isolation or in other (simpler) kinds of system (non-deducibility)” (81).
Emergentists also posit a concept related to non-deducibility called downward (or
mental) causation, namely “a downward determinative influence of the system as a
whole on the behavior of its parts, from which follows the non-deducibility of the latter
behavior (downward determination)” (82). Finally, the emergentist position “opposes
reductionistic treatments of emergent processes and properties, and, consequently, of
the systems exhibiting them, in principle theoretical unpredictability, i.e., the idea that
emergent properties or processes are not only novel but also cannot be theoretically
predicted before their first appearance” (82).
8 
What connects emergence, irreducibility, downward causation, and antireductionism is
the idea that properties, laws, and causal efficacy apply to what 
Fechner 
called “collective objects” (Heidelberger 2004: 299-300) rather than to individual
objects. An illustration of this principle has already been given in the introduction to
this paper in its proposal that Peirce’s work as an individual cannot be understood in
isolation from the collective historical scientific milieu to which it belonged. It is
significant that Peirce described his philosophy of inquiry using the example of the
termite mound, canonically used in our own time to illustrate the emergent
phenomena found in nature: “The individual scholar looks upon himself as only one of
a vast army of ants who are collectively building up something which no one of them
can comprehend in advance or is destined ever to see, but which is to be the solace,
stimulus, and strength of future generations.” (Peirce 1892a: 3375).
9 
Peirce’s description of science itself as an emergent phenomenon indicates the actual
meaning of his often-noted dictum that “Logic is rooted in the social principle” (Peirce
1878: 611; CP 2.654; W 3.284). Like insect societies, Peirce’s community of inquirers
cannot be accurately described as rational, cooperative dialogue between disinterested
individuals. If so, Peirce could not have written that “harmonious cooperation supposes
that fundamental principles are settled. Until they become so, dispute has to be the
method in which a given science shall make its way to the light” (1902: CP 2.166). He
also could not have written that for some crucial areas of inquiry, it is better to be a
“recluse” (1906: CP 6.175). Rather, Peirce’s “social principle” means that any
community has a mind of its own, far beyond any conscious intention of its individual
members. Like all groups, communities have emergent effects irreducible to the action
of the individuals which comprise them:
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None of us can fully realize what the minds of corporations are, any more than one
of my brain cells can know what the whole brain is thinking. But the law of mind
clearly points to the existence of such personalities, and there are many ordinary
observations which, if they were critically examined and supplemented by special
experiments, might, as first appearances promise, give evidence of the influence of
such greater persons upon individuals. It is often remarked that on one day half a
dozen people, strangers to one another, will take it into their heads to do one and
the same strange deed, whether it be a physical experiment, a crime, or an act of
virtue
.(Peirce 1892c: 21; CP 6.271; W 8:182-3)
10 
The previously mentioned Paul Kammerer gathered from personal everyday
experiences, newspaper clippings, etc. such an extensive collection of these “strange
deeds” that the treatise in which it appeared (Kammerer 1919) has been almost
universally misunderstood to be a treatise on coincidences (
e.g.
Freud 1919: 390-1; Jung 1952: 17-9; Koestler 1971: 135-43). The actual subject of his
work, however, was the causal efficacy of collective objects, or what he called “series,”
which his exhaustive collection and taxonomy of “coincidences” were intended only to
illustrate. As noted above, however, downward causation is inseparable from
antireductionism, and so we find Peirce repeatedly denying that this “influence of such
greater persons” is in any way mechanical. Peirce discusses this in terms of the
emergence of novelty itself:
Were things simpler, was variety less in the original nebula from which the solar
system is supposed to have grown than it is now when the land and sea swarms
with animal and vegetable forms with their intricate anatomies and still more
wonderful economies? It would seem as if there were an increase in variety, would
it not? And yet mechanical law, which the scientific infallibilist tells us is the only
agency of nature, mechanical law can never produce diversification. That is a
mathematical truth – a proposition of analytical mechanics; and anybody can see
without any algebraical apparatus that mechanical law out of like antecedents can
only produce like consequents. It is the very idea of law. So if observed facts point
to real growth, they point to another agency, to spontaneity for which infallibism
provides no pigeon-hole
.(c; 1897: CP 1.174)
11 
Expressed in today’s terminology, Peirce is here denying the principle of the causal
closure of the physical, thus paying the price necessary for securing causal efficacy for
higher-level properties (Brüntrup 1998). This solution, however, would seem to entail a
Cartesian substance dualism of mind and matter which Peirce elsewhere categorically
excludes as a violation of synechism (c. 1892: CP 7.570). What, then, is this other




12 Aristotle,  with  his  concept  of  ἕξις,  established  the  place  of  habit  in  the  history  of
philosophy (Nöth 2016: 38). The Scholastics used the Latin word habitus to translate
Aristotle’s Greek because ἕξις is a form of ἔχω, the Latin equivalent of which is habeo
(“to have”), hence the usual English translation “habit” (Viola 2014: 121). However, the
English  word  “state”  better  captures  the  nuances  of  the  Greek.  In  chemistry,  a
substance can be in a liquid state. In psychology, a person can be in a certain state of
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mind. In society, one is said to be in a certain state of life or, in terms of reputation, to
have achieved a certain stature. In law we have states and estates, and in politics we
have  statesmen  and  affairs  of  state.  Physicists  speak  of  state  variables.  Computer
scientists speak of finite state machines and stateful protocols. The Septuagint uses ἕξις
at  1  Samuel  16:7  and  Daniel  7:28  to  translate  Hebrew words  that  can  connote  the
dignity, majesty or splendor of occasions such as state visits, state dinners and state
funerals. The word ἕξις therefore connotes the idea of what persists or has a history, as
opposed to the ephemeral, and joins to this the idea of appearance or, in Latin, species.
13 Peirce’s idea of habit captures these nuances and more. In his system, habit is nothing
less than Thirdness itself, his “guess of the secret of the sphynx” (1887-1888: CP 1.410;
W 6.208) and what he “considered to be his most important innovation” (White 2015:
70). “Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third. Mind is First,
Matter  is  Second,  Evolution  is  Third”  (Peirce  1891:  175;  CP 6.32;  W 8.110).  Habit  in
Peirce’s system is nothing less than the origin of the universe:
Our conceptions of the first  stages of the development,  before time yet existed,
must be as vague and figurative as the expressions of the first chapter of Genesis.
Out  of  the  womb  of  indeterminacy  we  must  say  that  there  would  have  come
something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time would not yet
have been, this second flash was in some sense after the first, because resulting
from it. Then there would have come other successions ever more and more closely
connected,  the  habits  and  the  tendency  to  take  them  ever  strengthening
themselves, until the events would have been bound together into something like a
continuous flow. (1887-1888: CP 1.412; W 6.209)
14 Peirce’s repeated claim that Thirdness, under the aspect of habit, is the non-mechanical
agency responsible for the “general progress in physical nature from simple to complex
forms” (Deely 2001: 635), or from chaos to cosmos, is already sufficiently documented
by  Peirce’s  own  writings  and  by  the  secondary  literature.  What  remains  to  be
explained, however,  is  why modern scholarship does not,  for the most part,  take it
seriously. Indeed, “Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology or scientific metaphysics has often
been presented as the ‘black sheep’ or ‘white elephant’ of his philosophy” (Tiercelin
1997: 35). The reason proposed here is twofold, both expressions of the chasm between
Peirce’s cultural milieu and ours. First, the word “habit” no longer bears the scientific,
philosophical, and theological weight it once did. Aquinas used the term “supernatural
habits”  to  describe  Faith,  Hope,  and Charity,  which are  “the  finest  and greatest  of
spiritual  gifts”  (Peirce  1878:  612;  CP 2.655;  W 3.285),  whereas  “habit”  now  usually
describes things like smoking and brushing teeth. Second, Peirce’s conception of habit
was unabashedly Lamarckian, a position no longer academically respectable.
15 To understand what the word “habit” meant to Peirce, it is best to begin by returning
to his own habitual point of departure: chemistry and physics.  In this context,  it  is
observed that “all things have a tendency to take habits. For atoms and their parts,
molecules and groups of molecules, and in short every conceivable real object, there is
a  greater  probability  of  acting  as  on  a  former  like  occasion  than  otherwise.  This
tendency itself constitutes a regularity, and is continually on the increase” (1887-1880:
CP 1.409; W 6.208). As the word “probability” implies, however, this repetition is not
deterministic. It does not result from any physical law. “The law of habit exhibits a
striking contrast to all physical laws in the character of its commands.” (Peirce 1891:
169; CP 6.23; W 8.105). The law of habit is,  in other words, “purely psychical” (1891:
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CP 8.318),  and the difference between physical  and psychical  laws is  that  the latter
concerns final, or mental, causation rather than efficient, or material, causation (1902:
CP 1.265).
16 Peirce’s argument for mental causation, already mentioned in the introduction to this
paper as the logical consequence of emergence, is directly related to his Lamarckism,
which he saw as evolution viewed in its psychical aspect. The “transmission of acquired
characters,” Peirce writes,  “is  of  the general  nature of  habit-taking,  and this  is  the
representative and derivative within the physiological domain of the law of mind. Its
action is essentially dissimilar to that of a physical force; and that is the secret of the
repugnance of  such necessitarians as  Weismann to admitting its  existence.”  (Peirce
1893b: CP 6.299; W 8.192). This repugnance might also explain why it has recently been
argued that Peirce’s Lamarckism is “non-essential” (Robinson 2010: 239). Mistaken it
may be, but “non-essential” it is not; Peirce’s system succeeds or fails on the strength
of its claims that acquired habits can be inherited (Peirce 1880: CP 3.157-8; W 4.163-4)
and that the principle of natural selection is insufficient to account for the evolution of
the universe “from difformity to uniformity” (1903: CP 6.101). Moreover, “if the reader
will now kindly give himself the trouble of turning back a page or two, he will see that
this  account  of  Lamarckian evolution coincides  with the general  description of  the
action of love, to which, I suppose, he yielded his assent” (Peirce 1893b: 186-7; CP 6.300;
W 8.193). One is reminded of the consuetudo concinnat amorem of Lucretius (4.1283): “It is
habit that breeds love.”
 
3. Memory
17 Peirce  has  rightly  been identified  in  recent  literature  as  part  of  a  “third  force”  in
Victorian intellectual life represented by the English novelist Samuel Butler (1835-1902)
together with, among others, Ewald Hering (1834-1918) and Richard Semon (1859-1918)
of  Germany:  “All  these  men  sought  to  integrate  psychological  and  biological
explanation  and  to  demonstrate  that  purposefulness  was  part  of  the  evolutionary
process.  Many  were  thus  sympathetic  to  the  theory  that  came  to  be  called  neo-
Lamarckism – the belief that a major cause of evolutionary progress was the striving
(or  intelligence)  of  the  organisms  themselves.”  (Pauly  1982:  162).  The  crucial
contribution of Butler, Hering and Semon to this “third force” was their concept of
“organic  memory,”  through  which  Lamarckian  inheritance  was  explained  as  an
emergent variety of memory possessed by collectives rather than by individuals (Otis
1994: 1-40; Schacter 2001: 97-135).
18 “Organic memory” theories were very prominent in organized Monism. In its inaugural
volume,  published  in  1887,  The  Open  Court published  Hering’s  seminal  30 May  1870
lecture to the Imperial Academy of Sciences in Vienna, “Über das Gedächtnis als eine
allgemeine  Funktion  der  organisierten  Materie,”  translated  into  English  as  “On
Memory as a General Function of Organized Matter.” Hering’s work and its reception
by Haeckel are usually discussed by recent scholarship in the context of the so-called
“eclipse  of  Darwinism”  (Bowler  1983:  68-9),  the  historical  period  during  which
evolution itself was widely accepted but natural selection as its sole mechanism was
not.  Darwin  himself,  as  recent  scholarship  often  points  out,  incorporated  the
inheritance of acquired characteristics into his system and proposed his own theory of
“pangenesis”  to  explain  it  (Otis  1994:  43-6;  Harrington  1996:  89n74).  Lamarckism’s
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definitive exclusion from the scientific consensus was the work of August Weismann
(1834-1914),  not  Darwin,  and  the  updated  version  of  his  “Weismann  barrier”
formulated by Francis Crick (1916-2004) as the “central dogma of molecular biology”
blocks the way of inquiry to this day.
19 As  mentioned  in  the  previous  section  of  this  paper,  Peirce  attributed  Weismann’s
rejection of the inheritance of acquired characteristics not to scientific evidence, but
rather to necessitarian “repugnance” toward non-physical causation. This suggests a
kinship  between  Peirce’s  thought  and  organized  Monism,  for  which  the  main
significance of “organic memory” was not biological but cosmological. In the same way
that the “problems faced by Coleridge were of Newton’s making” (McLuhan 1957: 119),
those faced by Peirce and the Monists were of Darwin’s making:
To my way of regarding philosophy, all this movement was perfectly good scientific
procedure. For the simpler hypothesis which excluded the influence of ideas upon
matter had to be tried and persevered in until it was thoroughly exploded. But I
believe that now at last, at any time for the last thirty years, it has been apparent,
to every man who sufficiently considered the subject, that there is a mode of
influence upon external facts which cannot be resolved into mere mechanical
action, so that henceforward it will be a grave error of scientific philosophy to
overlook the universal presence in the phenomenon of this third category. Indeed,
from the moment that the Idea of Evolution took possession of the minds of men




In other words, Peirce saw in evolution the end of what Whitehead called the
“bifurcation of nature” between its physical and psychical aspects (Whitehead 1920:
30). Just as Galileo’s discoveries exploded the reigning cosmological partition between
the world above and the world below, so did Darwin’s discoveries explode the reigning
cosmological partition between the world without and the world within.
21 
The career of the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach (1838-1916) serves as a witness to the
simultaneous rise of “organic memory” and pragmatism during Peirce’s generation, an
era in which the Cartesian lines between physical and psychical realities were
beginning to blur. Mach began his career as a close colleague of Fechner, the founder of
psychophysics. In a letter dated 6 May 1909 to William James (1842-1910) in response to
the chapter titled “Concerning Fechner” in James’s book 
A Pluralistic Universe
, Mach calls Fechner “a fatherly friend to me personally as well as in his work
(Heidelberger 2004: 323). Mach also worked closely for twenty-five years in Prague with
Ewald Hering, whose above-mentioned treatise published in the inaugural volume of 
The Open Court
was the earliest authoritative statement of “organic memory” theory. In his book
Analyse der Empfindungen
, Mach credited Fechner with leading him to the questions and Hering with leading him
to the solutions (Otis 1994: 12). Writing in the pages of 
The Monist
, Mach explicitly recognized Peirce’s “The Architecture of Theories” for what it was:
both an “organic memory” theory among others in circulation at that time and a
fundamental challenge to scientific method as then understood:
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This author’s view of the evolution of natural laws does not strike me as so singular.
If predominance be given in our conception of the world to the spiritualistic or
psychical aspect, the laws of nature may be regarded as tremendous phenomena of
memory; as I attempted some years ago to set forth in a lecture of mine. The idea of
their evolution is then very near at hand. Of course I do not think that for the time
being we can gain much light from this view. For the present the “scientific
method” in the grooves of which we have moved for three hundred years,




Kammerer’s chapter on Semon’s “organic memory” theory (called the “Mneme”) cites
passages from other writings in which Mach maintains that memory is a collective as
well as an individual faculty, and that collective “organic memory” is the primordial
phenomenon of which heredity and instinct are merely aspects (Kammerer 1919:
285-6). Mach explicitly cites both Hering and Semon in one of these: “If we, with
Hering, ascribe to organisms the property of adapting successively better to recurring
processes, then we may recognize what is ordinarily called memory as part of a 
general
organic phenomenon […] Heredity, instinct and the like may then be described as
memory reaching beyond the individual. R. Semon […] is probably the first to attempt a
scientific account of the relation between heredity and memory.” (Mach 1905: 47).
23 
Kammerer traces Mach’s advocacy of “organic memory” to his support for the
worldview of “energetics,” a cosmological commitment he shared with one of the
founders of physical chemistry, Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932). Ostwald consequently
supported “organic memory” theory as well (Kammerer 1919: 286), defining memory in
his 
Grundriß der Naturphilosophie
“in a very general way as the quality by virtue of which the repetition in organisms of a
process which has taken place a number of times is preferred to new processes, because
it originates more easily and proceeds more smoothly,” adding that inorganic things
also exhibit this property but only rarely (Ostwald 1908: §56). This obviously resembles
Peirce’s observation concerning habit, already cited above, that “
For  atoms and their  parts,  molecules  and  groups  of  molecules,  and  in  short  every
conceivable real  object,  there is  a  greater probability  of  acting as  on a  former like
occasion than otherwise.” In the same work, Ostwald describes heredity in Lamarckian
terms as “being but an extension of memory to the offspring, which is to be conceived
as a part of the older organism” (Ostwald 1908: §58). It is no coincidence that Ostwald
was  a  committed  Monist  and  succeeded  Haeckel  in  1911  as  president  of  the
Monistenbund (Holt 1971: 278; Weikart 2002: 136).
 
4. Mind
24 Another  manifestation  of  nature’s  preference  for  repetition  over  novelty  is  the
tendency to create groups based on affinity. As already mentioned above, Fechner’s
term  for  such  a  group  was  the  “collective  object,”  defined  in  his  posthumously
published Kollektivmaßlehre (“Measuring Collectives”) as “an object that consists of an
unknown number of specimens that vary randomly, held together by a concept of kind
or  species”  (Heidelberger  2004:  299-300).  The  closest  contemporary  equivalent  of
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Ostwald’s  term  “memory”  for  this  primordial  quality  of  nature  is  perhaps  “non-
ergodicity,” which is responsible for the emergence of the “universe above the level of
atoms”  (Kauffman  2019).  This  phenomenon  has  also  been  recently  discovered  in
economics, in which memory-governed processes exhibit “path dependence” and yield
“macrostructure” resulting from “a multiplicity of possible asymptotic outcomes” and
are  thus  closely  related  to  all  “nonlinear  dynamical  systems  of  the  ‘dissipative’  or
‘autocatalytic’  or  ‘self-organizing’  type,  where positive feedbacks may cause certain
patterns  or  structures  that  emerge  to  be  self-reinforcing”  (Arthur,  Ermoliev  &
Kaniovski 1994).
25 Under this aspect of grouping, “organic memory” may be seen clearly as the essence of
Monist  cosmology,  uniting  its  dependence  on  the  Lamarckian  interpretation  of
evolution as a memory-governed process with its defining rejection of any ontological
substance dualism between mind and matter. This cosmology may have found its most
definitive formulation in the work of Peirce, which “supposes the one original law to be
the recognized law of mind, the law of association, of which the laws of matter are
regarded as mere special results” (c; 1893: CP 6.277). Peirce’s term for the primordial
tendency of nature to group phenomena by affinity was “generalization,” which he
equated with the action of habit:
Viewing a thing from the outside, considering its relations of action and reaction
with other things, it appears as matter. Viewing it from the inside, looking at its
immediate character as feeling, it appears as consciousness. These two views are
combined  when  we  remember  that  mechanical  laws  are  nothing  but  acquired
habits, like all the regularities of mind, including the tendency to take habits, itself;
and that this action of habit is nothing but generalization, and generalization is
nothing but the spreading of feelings. (Peirce 1892c: 20; CP 6.268; W 8.181-2)
26 “Feeling” is the inward aspect of what chance is the outward (Peirce 1892c: 19; CP 6.265;
W 8.181).  In  this  passage,  Peirce  is  paraphrasing  Fechner  (Heidelberger  2004:  270),
whose work Peirce was among the first  to analyze and,  in cooperation with Joseph
Jastrow, introduced to the United States (Cadwallader 1975: 171, 172, 174; Heidelberger
2004: 268). Everything in Fechner’s cosmology, and in Peirce’s as well, for both proceed
from the same psychophysical motivation, reflects the emergentist view that physical
laws  apply  not  to  individual  objects  but  to  the  “collective  objects”  that  Ostwald’s
“memory”  creates  by  taxonomically  dividing  similar  individuals  into  species.  The
resulting parallels  between Peirce and Fechner are indeed striking.  If  physical  laws
apply to groups of objects, then physical laws are indeterminate, for objects may be
grouped arbitrarily.  Fechner  was  in  fact  the  first  indeterminist  (Heidelberger  2004:
296),  a  position  later  seconded  by  Peirce’s  “tychism,”  and  Fechner’s  evolutionary
cosmology  harmonizes  with  Peirce’s  “agapism” “in  part  right  down to  the  details”
(ibid.: 268).
27 The early work of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) provides another illustration of the
close affinity between Peirce’s cosmology and Fechner’s. Nietzsche was “undoubtedly”
(Breazeale 1979:  36n74)  influenced by Fechner’s  friend and colleague Karl  Friedrich
Zöllner (1834-1882) and, through Zöllner, by Fechner’s student Ewald Hering (Emden
2005:  148-9),  who  has  already  been  mentioned  above  as  the  earliest  authoritative
“organic memory” theorist: “The inviolability of the laws of nature surely means that
sensation and memory are part of the essence of things. It is a matter of memory and
sensation that when one substance comes into contact with another it decides in just
the way that it does. At one time or another it learned to do so, i.e. the activities of the
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substance are developed laws. But then the decision must have been made by pleasure
and displeasure.”  (Nietzsche  1872:  40).  This  statement  strongly  recalls  Peirce’s  “The
Architecture of Theories” and “Evolutionary Love.”
28 Peirce’s primordial “law of association” operates in two ways. “We may note, here, in
passing, that of the two generally recognized principles of association, contiguity and
similarity, the former is a connection due to a power without, the latter a connection
due  to  a  power  within.”  (Peirce  1892b:  535;  CP 6.105;  W 8.136).  He  illustrates  this
distinction with examples taken from nature: “Protoplasm grows: and that not as a
crystal in a supersaturated or highly concentrated solution grows, by simply attracting
matter like itself. It grows by chemically transforming other substances into its own
chemical kind” (1893: CP 6.283). In other words, nature groups entities “together by a
concept of kind of species,” as Fechner has already pointed out above, both by bringing
like and like into physical contiguity and by making the already contiguous resemble
each other through imitation. The first method is what Kammerer calls the “attraction
hypothesis” (Kammerer 1919: 139-65) and the second is what he calls the “imitation
hypothesis” (ibid.: 123-38).
29 In his discussion of nature’s use of attraction and imitation to group objects by affinity,
Kammerer  mentions  “chemism,”  a  term  first  used  by  Friedrich  Wilhelm  Joseph
Schelling  (1775-1854).  Chemism  “refers  to  the  relations  of  affinities,  a  category  of
relatedness distinct from mechanism” and was thus an early formulation of what today
is  called  downward  causation  (van  Brakel  2012:  26).  This  calls  to  mind
“phanerochemistry,” a cenoscopic science invented by Peirce which eventually became
“semiotics”  (Tursman  1989:  453).  This  science  was  based  on  the  idea  of  chemical
valency which Peirce considered, as did Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831),
who devoted a  chapter of  his  Wissenschaft  der  Logik  to “chemism,” among the most
important ideas in the history of science (van Brakel 2012: 26). For both Peirce and
Hegel,  thought and nature alike are syllogistic  compounds formed according to the
laws of chemical affinity. The periodic table of the elements, says Peirce, “has much
more pertinence to pragmatism than appears at first sight; since my researches into
the  logic  of  relatives  have  shown  beyond  all  sane  doubt  that  in  one  respect
combinations of concepts exhibit a remarkable analogy with chemical combinations;
every concept having a strict valency” (1907: CP 5.469).
30 Paul Kammerer, who in 1919 enjoyed the advantage of having survived Peirce by five
years,  was  able  to  benefit  from  Einstein’s  1915  general  theory  of  relativity  when
proposing  his  own  physical  interpretation  of  the  continuity  of  generalization  and
memory.  The equivalence of  mass and energy means that  form, which is  a  kind of
energy (Kammerer 1919: 128), is subject to the same law of inertia which governs mass
(ibid.:  450).  Inheritance  of  acquired  characteristics  as  a  manifestation  of  organic
memory (ibid.: 285), the phenomenon of “clumping” in random events (ibid.: 175-81),
magnetic  remanence  (ibid.:  127),  contact  metamorphism  (ibid.:  199),  the  increasing
tendency of people over time to resemble their pets (ibid.:  354-5) and spouses (ibid.:
351-2), crowd psychology (ibid.: 385) and, most notoriously, “coincidences” are only a
few among the very many examples adduced by Kammerer of Peirce’s “communication
or extension of a Form,” comprising “evidence of a primordial habit-taking tendency”
which “shows us like things acting in like ways because they are alike” (Peirce 1892c:
17; CP 6.262; W 8.179). Einstein’s theory could also explain Peirce’s primordial “law of
association”  between  like  and  like  (c; 1898:  CP 7.515)  or  tendency  toward
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generalization,  “the analogue of Gravitation in the Physical  world” (1902:  CP 7.375),
because  attraction and inertia  cannot  be  distinguished with respect  to  non-inertial
reference frames (Kammerer 1919: 135-6). It is worth mentioning that Einstein himself,
according to Hans Przibram (1874-1944), “described Kammerer’s book as brilliant and
by no means absurd” (Coen 2006: 513).
 
5. Form
31 Fechner’s “collective object,” as the Latin word species and its Greek equivalent εἶδος
imply, means both “classification” and “form.” Recognizing this equivalence, Peirce
accounts for the physical efficacy of “collective objects,” or what the present discussion
has called “generalization,” in terms of “Form.” Using the word “originality” to refer to
what is now called “emergence,” Peirce states that originality “
is not an attribute of the matter of life, present in the whole only so far as it is present
in the smallest parts, but is an affair of form,  of the way in which parts none of which
possess it are joined together […] All supremacy of mind is of the nature of Form.”
(Peirce 1908: 435; CP 4.611). The physical efficacy of generalizations, which Peirce calls
not only “supremacy of mind” but also “semiosis,” is consequently a species of formal
causality  (Deely  2001:  633-4),  which  in  Aristotle’s  Greek  is  the  causality  of  εἶδος
. “I use the word‘sign’ in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or
extension of a Form (or feature).” (1906: EP 2.477).
32 Morphology,  the  science  of  form,  was  founded  by  Johann  Wolfgang  von Goethe
(1749-1832) and formed the nucleus of Monist cosmology. The prolific Monist publicist
Wilhelm  Bölsche  (1861-1939),  an  ardent  proponent  of  both  Fechner  and  Haeckel
(Heidelberger 2004:  261),  writes in his  biography of  the latter that Haeckel  “saw in
Darwin  the  absolute  ‘open  Sesame’  to  all  the  doors  of  philosophic  morphology”
(Bölsche  1900:  173).  This  recalls  Peirce’s  statement,  already  cited  above,  that  “
from the moment that the Idea of Evolution took possession of the minds of men the
pure Corpuscular Philosophy together with nominalism had had their doom
pronounced,” for Peirce too saw morphology as the scientific fruit of Darwin’s
cosmological revolution:
“Everybody is familiar with the useful, though fluctuating and relative distinction of
matter and form; and it is strikingly true that distinctions and classifications founded
upon  form  are,  with  very  rare  exceptions,  more  important  to  the  scientific
comprehension of the behavior of things than distinctions and classifications founded
upon matter.” (1907: CP 5.469). 
33 What Peirce calls the “relative distinction of matter and form” is simply a paraphrase
of  the  defining  Monist  assertion  of  the  relative  distinction  between  psychical  and
physical realities. For this reason, Fechner “fashioned the psychophysical methods on
the  same  mathematical  grounds  of  form”  (Stephenson  1980:  15).  Just  as  Peirce
identified his “law of mind” as the tendency toward generalization, the morphologist
D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson (1860-1948) identified that “which we call by Goethe’s
name of Morphology” as the science of generalization: “the form of the earth, of  a
raindrop or a rainbow, the shape of the hanging chain, or the path of a stone thrown up
into the air, may all be described, however inadequately, in common words; but when
we have learned to comprehend and to define the sphere, the catenary, or the parabola,
we have made a wonderful and perhaps a manifold advance.” (Thompson 1917: 719). He
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ends the discussion and the book with a footnote crediting Fechner’s own paper on the
mathematical treatment of organic forms and processes (1849) with capturing “the gist
of the whole matter” (Thompson 1917: 777).
34 
The relationship between “organic memory” and morphology was stated as follows by
Paul Carus, identified above as the editor of 
The Monist:
“Memory is no mysterious power; it is the preservation of form in feeling organisms.”
(Carus 1890: 73). Whereas Haeckel had come to Monism through the concept of organic
form, Carus came to Monism through the concept of mathematical form as conceived in
the 
Formenlehreof HermannGraßmann
, under whom Carus had studied in the Gymnasium at Stettin (Hay 1956: 505). This
“general science of form” arises from a synthetic geometry based on directions, which
are natural, as opposed to a Cartesian analytic geometry based on dimensions, which
are conventional. For Carus, this made possible a new science of generalization very
similar to Thompson’s: “Partial knowledge may lead us to think the world is diverse
and disjointed, but a more generalized mathematics leads us to recognize that there are
forms in the world which belong to everything.” (
Ibid.: 506). Even more fundamental for Carus’s Monism, however, was
Graßmann’s implication that the laws of thought and the laws of nature are one:
Kant had faltered, Carus believed, because he had not realized that form was not
only a quality of mind but of all reality. There was a strict correspondence between
knowledge and the external world because “all  elements of objective reality are
inseparably united with the corresponding elements of subjective reality.” Because
our minds and the external world had the same formal structure, we could employ
what  Carus  called  “purely  formal”  reasoning,  beginning with  positive  facts  and
proceeding according to the rules of logic, and be assured of correct results. (Meyer
1962: 600-1)
35 Carus  phrased  this  same  observation  elsewhere  in  a  passage  which  Peirce  cites  as
expressing  the  true  meaning  of  Monism:  “Subjectivity  must  be  conceived  as  the
product of a cooperation of certain elements which are present in the objective world”
(1890:  W 8.43).  This  blurring  of  subjective  and  objective  realities  was  frequently
acknowledged by Peirce himself as the very basis of pragmatism, observing that “man’s
mind has a  natural  adaptation to imagining correct  theories  of  some kinds,  and in
particular to correct theories about forces, without some glimmer of which he could
not form social ties and consequently could not reproduce his kind” (1903: CP 5.591). As
discussed above, the distinction between mind and matter is only relative because both
are  expressions  of  the  “law  of  mind,”  or  nature’s  primordial  tendency  toward
generalization. “Generalization, the spilling out of continuous systems, in thought, in
sentiment,  in deed, is  the true end of life” (NEM 4.346),  and generalization’s fullest
scientific expression is morphology. It is not coincidental that Whitehead, “whose first
book, Universal Algebra is as he says in his Introduction, largely devoted to a reworking
of Grassmann” (Hay 1956: 506), was still writing decades later: “The secret of progress
is the speculative interest in abstract schemes of morphology.” (Whitehead 1929: 58).
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6. Generals
36 Which side Peirce chose in the ancient dispute between nominalism and realism is well-
known:  “I  am  myself  a  scholastic  realist  of  a  somewhat  extreme  stripe.”  (1907:
CP 5.470).  He  saw  this  dispute  as  a  fight  to  the  death  and  would  not  tolerate  the
lukewarm, writing that “a man as he gradually comes to feel the profound hostility of
the two tendencies will, if he is not less than a man, become engaged with one or the
other and can no more obey both than he can serve God and Mammon” (1871: CP 8.38;
W 2.486).
37 As  previous  sections  of  this  paper  have  observed,  Peirce  repeatedly  expresses  his
insistence on the reality of generals using arguments that we recognize today as strong
emergentism.  E
mergent properties, irreducibility, downward causation, and antireductionism may be
viewed as corollaries of the anti-nominalist worldview which considers generals to be
just as real, if not more so, than the individuals which comprise them and which
therefore attributes to them properties, laws, and causal efficacy irreducible to lower
levels of generalization. The later sections of this paper observed how Peirce not only
insisted on the reality of generals but also their life and growth, following a primordial
“law of mind” according to which generals are progressively absorbed into higher
levels of generalization. Generalization, as observed previously, is an indispensable
ingredient of reality itself, “for mere individual existence or actuality without any
regularity whatever is a nullity. Chaos is pure nothing.” (Peirce 1905: 178; CP 5.431).
38 
Why, then, has “all modern philosophy of every sect has been nominalistic” (1903:
CP 1.19), even though “after physical science has discovered so many general principles
in Nature, nominalism becomes a disgraceful habit of thought” (1906: CP 6.175)? The
answer has to do with realism’s dependence on “organic memory” and its close
relation, imagination. The early Nietzsche, already quoted above, will serve again to
illustrate the views of Fechner and Hering, so fundamental to Monist cosmology, that
he absorbed through his reading of Zöllner: “All explaining and knowing is actually
nothing but categorizing […] The primal procedure is to seek out some likeness
between one thing and another, to identify like with like. 
Memorylives by means of this activity and practices it continually.Confusion
is the primal phenomenon.” (Nietzsche 1872: 53, 54).
39 
With the word “confusion,” Nietzsche identifies the mystery at the heart of any
generalization: its partial indeterminacy (c; 1896: CP 1.434). 
“Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal.” (Nietzsche 1873: 80).
We  arrive  at  the  generalization  “leaf”  only  by  overlooking  the  ways  in  which  the
entities we include within that classification differ from one another. A generalization
is therefore an image, for it is “the nature of an image to be in something different
from itself.” (Plotinus: III. vi. 14). “All categorization is an attempt to arrive at images.”
(Nietzsche 1872: 21). The mind sees a unity-in-difference not through its logical powers,
but rather through the metaphorical exercise of its powers of imagination and memory
(Verene  1981:  41).  This  is  the  reason  for  nominalist  iconoclasm.  The  power  of
generalization, Nietzsche writes, is “an anti-scientific power, because it does not have
the same degree of interest in everything that is perceived” (Nietzsche 1872: 21).
40 The allure of nominalism is thus the comfort of “exact science” and the privileged role
it grants to the observer, whom it allows to stand outside of nature as an innocent
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bystander.  Nominalism  is  a  form  of  sleep  that  dreams,  fallibility,  confusion,  and
conscience cannot disturb.  Even more alluring,  however,  is  that nominalism, unlike
realism, does not require faith. That generals “have life, generative life” is “a matter of
experiential fact. But whether it is so or not is not a question to be settled by producing
a microscope or telescope or any recondite observations of any kind. Its evidence stares
us all in the face every hour of our lives. Nor is any ingenious reasoning needed to
make it plain. If one does not see it, it is for the same reason that some men have not a
sense of sin; and there is nothing for it but to be born again and become as a little child.
If you do not see it, you have to look upon the world with new eyes.” (1902: CP 1.219).
 
7. Religion
41 The second of Peirce’s two New Testament references cited in the previous section,
“one must become as a little child” (Matthew 18:3), is echoed by his eulogy upon the
death of Francis Ellingwood Abbot (1836-1903), a member of the Metaphysical Club and
the  first  American  philosopher  to  support  Darwin  (Peden 1994:  285):  “He  had  that
spiritual insight into philosophy that Wordsworth attributes to the child.” To this high
praise he adds another New Testament reference (Matthew 5:8):
One of  the  benefits  of  an  acquaintance  with  Dr.  Abbot  was  that  it  gave  a  new
conception of the saying, “The pure in heart shall see God.” The unsophisticated
purity of his love of and apprehension of the truth, oblivious of the tide of opinion,
was a quality without which the Introduction to his “Scientific Theism,” wherein he
put his finger unerringly (as the present writer thinks) upon the one great blunder
of all modern philosophy, could not have been written. (Peirce 1903: 306)
42 This  is  another  way  of  saying  that  the  faith  upon which  rests  the  ability  to  “see”
generals  is  the  basis  of  science,  for  Abbot’s  achievement  in  his  “Introduction”  to
Scientific Theism (1885) was to show “that science has always been at heart realistic, and
always must be so; and upon comparing his writings with mine, it is easily seen that
these features of nominalism which I pointed out in science are merely superficial and
transient”  (1903:  CP 1.20;  cf.  CP 4.1).  The  impossibility  of  a  science  based  on
nominalism, which denies generals as well as the faith required to “see” them, was
perfectly evident to Abbot: “Since genera and species are classifications of things based
on their supposed resemblances and differences, the denial of all objective reality to
genera and species is the denial of all objective reality to the supposed resemblances
and differences of things themselves; the denial of all knowledge of the relations of
objects  is  the  denial  of  all  knowledge  of  the  objects  related;  and  this  denial  is
tantamount to the assertion that things-in-themselves are utterly unknown.” (Abbot
1885: 3-4).
43 The  goal  of  organized  Monism  was  the  reconciliation  of  religion  and  science.  The
implied  purpose  of  Haeckel’s  “Monistic  Religion”  was  “to  justify  nonempirical
procedures  in  science  so  important  to  Haeckel’s  scientific  views,  particularly  his
interpretations of Darwinism and the implications of Darwinism. The Monistic Religion
was to be, for Haeckel, a logical aid when empiricism failed.” (Holt 1971: 277). Haeckel’s
crusade was joined by Paul Carus, editor of The Open Court, every copy of which had the
slogan “Devoted to the Religion of Science” printed in its masthead:
Professor Haeckel recognises as the highest duty of our time (das höchste Ziel unserer
Geistesthätigkeit) the amalgamation of religion and science in the sense proposed by
The Open Court, the efforts of which journal he especially mentions in his preface. In
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a private letter he adds that the differences that obtain between his views and those
editorially presented in The Open Court appear to him of secondary importance only,
and should not hinder us from fighting shoulder to shoulder. We gladly agree with
him, and hail him as a companion-in-arms. (Carus 1893: 3529)
44 Peirce,  a  frequent  contributor  to  The  Open  Court as  well  as  to  The  Monist,  was  also
“Devoted to the Religion of Science”: “I have said enough, I think, to show that, though
synechism is not religion, but, on the contrary, is a purely scientific philosophy, yet
should it become generally accepted, as I confidently anticipate, it may play a part in
the  onement  of  religion  and  Science.”  (c; 1892:  CP 7.578).  This  may  be  explained,
similarly  to  those aspects  of  Peirce’s  thought discussed in previous sections of  this
paper, as a corollary of Peirce’s attribution not only of reality, but of personality, to
generals. The recognition of “greater persons” implied by synechism necessarily entails
theism to the extent that it presented him with a difficulty:
A  difficulty  which  confronts  the  synechistic  philosophy  is  this.  In  considering
personality, that philosophy is forced to accept the doctrine of a personal God; but
in considering communication, it cannot but admit that if there is a personal God,
we  must  have  a  direct  perception  of  that  person  and  indeed  be  in  personal
communication with him. Now, if that be the case, the question arises how it is
possible that the existence of this being should ever have been doubted by anybody.
The only answer that I can at present make is that facts that stand before our face
and eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the ones most
easily discerned. That has been remarked from time immemorial. (Peirce 1892b:
558-9; CP 6.162; W 8.156-7)
45 The general character of the object of worship also extends to worship itself, because
“religion cannot reside in its totality in a single individual. Like every species of reality,
it is essentially a social, a public affair. It is the idea of a whole church, welding all its
members together in one organic, systemic perception of the Glory of the Highest – an
idea having a growth from generation to generation and claiming a supremacy in the
determination of all conduct, private and public” (Peirce 1893a: 3559; CP 6.429). The
supremacy of the general over the individual also extends to the individual’s religious
calling: “A man is capable of having assigned to him a rôle in the drama of creation, and
so far as he loses himself in that role, – no matter how humble it may be, – so far he
identifies  himself  with  its  Author.”  (c; 1892:  CP 7.572).  Peirce’s  opposition  to
necessitarianism has religious implications as well: “In short, necessitarianism once out
of the way, which puts nature under the rule of blind and inexorable law, that leaves no
room for any other influence, we find no other serious objection to a return to the
principle of Christianity.” (W 8.126).
 
8. Pragmatism
46 The argument of this paper began with emergence and now ends with pragmatism.
When  viewed  from  the  vantage  point  of  the  late  19th  century  Monist  and  related
movements, such as Abbot’s, for “free religion” which emerged in Darwin’s wake and
comprised the historical background from which it emerged, pragmatism may be seen
to be what religions both “free” and established have always defined as faith: “thinking
with assent.” Pragmatism, in other words, is thought which assents to what no sane
person denies, which is the evidence of things seen as well as unseen. “What the true
definition of Pragmatism may be, I find it very hard to say; but in my nature it is a sort
of instinctive attraction for living facts.” (1903: CP 5.64). The most living and evident of
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facts is that the non-atomic things constantly present to our senses, head, and heart
really do exist, regardless of what we think about them. “Now whoever cares to know
what pragmaticism is should understand that on its metaphysical side it is an attempt
to solve the problem: In what way can a general be unaffected by any thought about
it?” (c; 1905: CP 5.503).
47 As discussed in the previous section, Haeckel founded Monism upon the realization
that Darwinism had made it necessary to justify non-empirical procedures in science.
The “Monist Religion” was intended to provide a logical aid when empiricism failed.
Peirce too learned this lesson in the context of “free religion,” writing of the author of
Scientific Theism, co-founder of the Free Religious Association and fellow contributor to
The Monist (Abbot 1895): “F. E. Abbot, one of the strongest thinkers I ever encountered,
first showed me that there were just three [worlds]; the outer, the inner, and the logical
world.” (1902: CP 8.299). Pragmatism is the logical world that bridges the outer and the
inner, and thus spans the nominalist discontinuity between empiricism and idealism.
As Peirce points out, however, “the rivulets at the head of the river of pragmatism are
easily traced back to almost any desired antiquity” (c; 1906: CP 5.11). Ernst Mach too
emphasizes the venerability of the approach that bridges empirical and non-empirical
procedures in a passage Kammerer used as an epigraph to his above-mentioned chapter
on the “attraction hypothesis”  (Kammerer 1919:  139):  “Purely experimental  inquiry,
moreover, does not exist, for, as Gauss says, virtually we always experiment with our
thoughts. And it is precisely that constant, corrective interchange or intimate union of
experiment  and  deduction,  as  it  was  cultivated  by  Galileo  in  his  Dialogues and  by
Newton  in  his  Optics,  that  is  the  foundation  of  the  benign  fruitfulness  of  modern
scientific inquiry as contrasted with that of antiquity, where observation and reflexion
ofttimes pursued their respective courses like two strangers.” (Mach 1903: 302).
48 Viewing pragmatism in its historical context, namely the first episode in the reception
of  Darwin,  also allows us  to  understand this  “corrective interchange” as  dialectical
realism. Peirce formulates the “essential proposition of pragmaticism” as the logical
dual  to  the  neo-Scholastic  Dictum  de  omni  (Peirce  1905:  179-80;  CP 5.435),  which
nominalists consider a tautology but which realists consider “a fundamental law of the
universe”  that  expresses  “the  intercommunity  of  nature”  (Mill  1843:  1:234-5).  With
respect to pragmatism’s dialectical aspect, Peirce asserts that pragmaticism “belongs
essentially to the triadic class of philosophical doctrines, and is much more essentially
so than Hegelianism is” (Peirce 1905: 181; CP 5.436). Recognizing its dialectical nature
helps to avoid the misconception that pragmatism “understands knowing the world as
inseparable from agency within it” (Legg & Hookway 2019),  a  misconception Peirce
himself  tried  to  clarify:  “Accordingly, the pragmaticist does not make the
summum bonum
to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the
existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to
be 
destined, which is what we strive to express in calling themreasonable
. In its higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through self-control,
and this gives the pragmaticist a sort of justification for making the rational purport to
be general.
”(Peirce 1905: 178; CP 5.433).
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Conclusion
49 This  paper  has  argued  that  a  clue  to  the  relationship  between  emergence  and
pragmatism  may  be  found  in  the  historical  environment  in  which  Peirce’s  mature
system developed, especially in the international Monist and related movements for
“free”  or  “scientific”  religion  which  emerged  as  part  of  the  early  reception  of
Darwinism. This clue is the family of “organic memory” theories, strongly associated
with Monism, which proposed that perception, cognition, instinct, habit, inheritance
and evolution are all manifestations of a primordial law which associates individuals
into groups by affinity. Emergence comprises the properties, laws and causal efficacy of
these groups, which are not reducible to those of the individuals which comprise them.
Habit  exhibits  this  grouping under  the  aspect  of  repetition.  From repetition comes
memory, and from memory comes mind. The measure of mind is form, mediated by
signs.  As  mind moves  through opposite  powers  of  the  sign (Verene 1981:  212),  the
similar,  by attraction,  become contiguous and the contiguous,  by imitation,  become
similar,  forming  generals.  From  the  progressive  assimilation  of  generals  into  ever
greater generals comes awareness of “greater persons,” and from conversation with
these “greater persons” comes religion, and from religion comes pragmatism, which
Peirce at the end seemed to know simply as another name for piety:
Direct endeavor can achieve almost nothing. It is as easy by taking thought to add a
cubit to one
’
s stature as it is to produce an idea acceptable to any of the Muses by merely
straining for it before it is ready to come. We haunt in vain the sacred well and
throne of Mnemosyne; the deeper workings of the spirit take place in their own
slow way, without our connivance. Let but their bugle sound, and we may then
make our effort, sure of an oblation for the altar of whatsoever divinity its savor
gratifies
.(Peirce 1893b: 187; CP 6.301; W 8.193)
50 Peirce usually described the mystery, however, in more technical terms which indicate
how science may someday discard its nominalist fetters: “The general might be defined
as that to which the principle of excluded middle does not apply.” (c; 1905: CP 5.505).
Precisely by means of discarding the principle of the excluded middle, recent research
has done much to free first-order logic from being “a nominalist enterprise” (Hintikka
1996: 7, 133) and thus to establish “a form of scientific realism in which relations are as
fundamental  as  entities”  (Brenner  2012).  “Organic  memory”  was  recovered  in  this
quest  by  the  cybernetician  Raymond  Ruyer  (1902-1987)  in  work  that  was  warmly
acknowledged by Stéphane Lupasco (1900-1988), whose logic of the “included middle”
is currently being developed by both Brenner and Basarab Nicolescu (Lupasco 1948;
Ruyer 1952; Nicolescu 2014). Friedrich S. Rothschild (1899-1995), who coined the term
“biosemiotics” (Favareau 2010: 430), also acknowledged Ruyer’s work (Rothschild 1994).
However, the role of “organic memory” as the link between emergence, pragmatism,
and realism was clear long before Peirce. The pragmatic principle that our minds and
the  external  world  have  the  same  formal  structure  was  anticipated  by  the  “New
Science” of Giambattista Vico (1668-1744),  whose kinship with Peirce has long been
discerned (Fisch  1969:  201).  “Vico’s  most  important  principle:  ‘Doctrines  must  take
their beginning from that of the matters of which they treat,’ requires that memory be
the basis of science.” (Verene 1981: 108).
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ABSTRACTS
Peirce’s system may be identified as one of a family of “organic memory” theories which
flourished during the period in which he developed it, especially in the Monist journals which
published much of his late work. “Organic memory” theories were vigorously opposed in their
own day and are remembered in our own, if at all, only in connection with discredited theories
such as racial memory and Lamarckian inheritance. When read in the context of their own time,
however, “organic memory” theories stand revealed as among modernity’s first attempts at a
still-unrealized, post-nominalist re-foundation of science. Being thus closely related to Peirce’s
own project both in time and in spirit, they deserve to be understood on their own terms. The
synthesis of these theories in the book 
Das Gesetz der Serie
(1919) by the Austrian biologist Paul Kammerer (1880-1926), a prominent representative of
organized Monism's European branch, provides insight into the systematic unity of the various
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